Showing posts with label Cyberwar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cyberwar. Show all posts

How It Could Happen - The Brink

SUBHEAD: The Chinese had more planes, as well as air-defense systems that made B-52 raids from Diego Garcia risky.

[Author's note: This is part 3 of a 5 parts of a fictional narrative tracing out a scenario of American imperial defeat and collapse.  As the war in Kenya reaches a climax, the action shifts to the United States—and to a president who has his back to the wall and very few options left]

By John Michael Greer on 17 OCtober 2012 for Archdruid Report - (http://thearchdruidreport.blogspot.com/2012/10/how-it-could-happen-part-three-to-brink.html)


Image above: An Amarican B-52 bomber is loaded at Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. From (http://www.zianet.com/tedmorris/dg/bombers3-b52.html).

This week's post is the third of five parts of a fictional narrative tracing out a scenario of American imperial defeat and collapse.  As the war in Kenya reaches a climax, the action shifts to the United States—and to a president who has his back to the wall and very few options left.

Back in the United States, few people had any clear sense of how bad the situation had become. The major news media, as they had done for decades, accepted whatever came from the White House and the Pentagon at face value. Internet news sites contradicted the official story in every detail, but the internet’s low signal to noise ratio made an accurate picture hard to assemble. Still, cracks were spreading in the wall of denial.

The photo of the USS George Washington wrecked and abandoned on a Kenyan sandbar was an internet sensation; two members of the House of Representatives had called for hearings on the war, though their request was stonewalled by the House leadership; through the sullen air of late summer, a sense was beginning to spread that something had gone very wrong.

In the White House, President Weed did not need to guess. Reports from the US forces in Kenya came in daily via the diplomatic line; when Nairobi fell, after a bitter three-day battle near Konza, a new line was jerry-rigged from Kisumu in the far west of the country.

Most of the news was bad. The Chinese had brought in more planes, as well as air-defense systems that were making B-52 raids from Diego Garcia risky—two of the bombers had been shot down by surface-to-air missiles already. Meanwhile, there was no way to get supplies in to the American forces and their Kenyan allies; another fleet could not be sent as long as Chinese cruise missiles might be waiting for them, and the loss of air superiority made airlifts equally problematic.

“We tried to get Predator drones in to hit their air defense radar, but they were spotted and taken out,” the DCI—Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the CIA—was saying. “Chinese technology is, well, as good as ours these days.”

What he was not saying, Weed knew, was that Chinese technology was better than its US equivalents these days, and half a dozen other countries had the same advantage. The reason wasn’t a mystery, either; most of the officials in the room, starting with Weed himself, had taken donations now and then in exchange for promoting or approving programs that were far more profitable to their manufacturers than they were useful to the US military.

“The Chinese this, the Chinese that,” said the president’s national security adviser. “We’ve talked about them every single day since this started. We need to do something about them.” The vice president, sitting next to her, nodded, and President Weed tilted his head toward her, listening.

All at once, the Secretary of Defense decided that he’d had enough. He slammed his folder of briefings down on the table, pushed his chair back, and stood up. “You’re crazy. I mean that in all seriousness. Since day one you’ve acted as though nothing could go wrong, and when it does, all you can think of is doubling down.” He turned to the president. “Jim, you’ll have my written resignation tomorrow.”
“Bill,” said Weed, “for God’s sake, not now!”
“Personal reasons,” said the Secretary. “Health concerns. I’ll give you all the plausible deniability you want, but I’m through.” 
The door slammed behind him a moment afterward.



Marines on perimeter guard spotted the messengers first, walking up the main road from Kitale under a white flag. Word came by radio a few minutes later to GHQ in the town of Endebess further west, under the slopes of soaring Mount Elgon. The reply came back at once: get a technical and bring them in. The Marines had a few of the pickups left, though fuel was scarce, like ammo, food, everything else; they managed to scrounge enough gasoline for the trip, and sent the messengers on their way.

The technical skidded to a stop in front of a commandeered primary school not long thereafter. Lieutenant General Jay Seversky, the American commander, greeted the messengers glumly.

After introductions, the Tanzanian colonel who led the group said, “I think you know why I am here, General. You and your men have fought very well, but—” He shrugged. “There is only so much a man can do. The Coalition command has ordered a final assault on your positions. I will not say when, but soon. Maybe you will survive that. Maybe you will survive the next one, too. But—” Another shrug. “The matter is settled; it is merely a question of how many more lives are lost.”
Seversky nodded, once. “I assume you’ve got terms to suggest.”
“Of course.” The colonel pulled an envelope from inside his jacket and handed it to him. Seversky opened it, glanced over the sheet of paper, and nodded again. “I’ll need time to consult with my staff.”
“Of course,” the colonel said again. “Twenty-four hours? I think we can allow that much.”
When the men had gone, Seversky took the sheet of paper back inside. The remaining officers of his staff and the commanders of the four divisions were waiting. He handed the paper to the nearest, waited until it had circled the table.

“Anything from Washington?” This from Tom Blumenthal, the commander of the 101st Airborne.


Seversky snorted. “They’re, quote, evaluating options for a relief force. Unquote.”


“Meaning the bastards can’t do a thing,” said Blumenthal. Nobody argued with him.

For a long moment nobody in the room said anything. They were looking at Blumenthal, and after another moment, Seversky figured out why. The 101st Airborne. The Battle of the Bulge. “Nuts.”


Blumenthal cleared his throat. “If I thought it would gain anything,” he said, “I’d say fight to the last man. But—” His gaze dropped. “This isn’t Bastogne and Patton’s not on the way. I think we have to face the fact that we’ve had our clock cleaned.”

Word of the American force’s surrender reached the White House half an hour before the story broke in the international media. It was a Tuesday morning in September, with the first hint of autumn in the air. Weed stared out the windows of the Oval Office, wishing he could take that September fishing trip he’d planned months ago. No chance of that, not now. Grimly, he turned to his press secretary and told him to have the news media ready for an important press conference at 6 that evening.

Before then, he would have even worse news to face.



At 2 in the morning local time, Chinese special forces personnel left a submarine in the middle of the Indian Ocean and climbed aboard radar-evading inflatable boats. An hour later, they crawled up a poorly guarded beach near the southern tip of Diego Garcia and found hiding places in the thick jungle just inland.

Silenced weapons and explosive charges were passed from hand to hand as the four strike teams prepared for their missions. The first explosions hit without warning; by the time the garrison realized what was happening, the heavily guarded island’s radar stations and air defenses were already disabled. Ten minutes later a dark winged shape—the first of a dozen stealth-equipped troop transports packed with Peoples Liberation Army soldiers—came hurtling out of the night to touch down on the captured main runway. By dawn, the entire island was in Chinese hands.

As details trickled into the White House situation room, what kept circling through Weed’s mind was sheer disbelief. Diego Garcia was the beating heart of the entire US Indian Ocean presence, a key logistics and intelligence center and a base from which B-52s could pound trouble spots from Africa to Southeast Asia. Losing Tanzania was a problem; losing Kenya was a crisis; losing Diego Garcia... He shook his head, tried to think.
“Sir?” An aide had come in. “The press conference.”

“Yes. Yes, of course.” He drew in a deep breath and went to the door.
It was by all accounts one of the best speeches of Jameson Weed’s political career. Extempore—he had drawn up a draft before the news came about Diego Garcia, but it was sitting on a desk in the Oval Office as he walked up to the podium—he sketched out the situation, explained what had happened in Kenya, denounced China’s behavior in thundering terms, and broke the news of the fall of Diego Garcia. “Let the Peoples Republic of China make no mistake,” he said. “The United States will not let this unprovoked aggression stand. We will respond with all the forces at our disposal. Nothing is off the table.” He leaned forward, haggard and minatory. “Nothing.”

Half an hour later, the American embassy in Beijing filled in the details for the Chinese government’s benefit: unless China withdrew its forces from East Africa and Diego Garcia, the United States would respond with tactical nuclear strikes. The Chinese response was swift and public. Speaking to a crowd of reporters, the Chinese premier informed the world tartly that China would never bow to threats, and that any attack on Chinese territory or military forces would receive a corresponding response. As he spoke, Chinese diplomats were making it clear to their American opposite numbers that “corresponding response” in this case meant Chinese ICBMs heading for American cities.

Later that evening, the president of Russia appeared on television screens around the world. With Slavic bluntness, he brushed aside the evasions the other leaders had used in public. “The Russian Federation has been informed,” he told the world, “that the United States has threatened China with nuclear attack. Such threats are impermissible in today’s world. It is therefore my duty to state that treaties between the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China require us, if China is attacked with nuclear weapons, to respond with our own nuclear arsenal.”



No one who lived through the three days that followed would ever forget them. Seven billion people who had come to think of mushroom clouds as a bad memory of the Cold War suddenly had to face the imminent prospect of nuclear war. Defiant words from Washington, proud rebuttals from Beijing, and frantic diplomacy by the United Nations punctuated the panic that gripped the globe.

The words of the Emperor of Japan, broadcast live to a worldwide audience—“Japan alone among nations has suffered attack by nuclear weapons, and it is Our deepest wish that no other nation should share that same bitter fate. We ask—no, We plead—that the leaders of the contending powers step back from so terrible an abyss”—spoke for billions. Meanwhile, in missile silos, bomber bases, and submarines, young men and women waited for orders that, for all practical purposes, would mean the end of the world.

In the United States, civil defense plans dating back to the Eisenhower administration were dusted off and activated. One of them mandated that the National Defense Highway System—better known as the nation’s freeways—be closed to civilian traffic. There were good practical reasons for that step, but nobody had thought about what would happen when millions of Americans tried to flee urban targets and found the freeways barricaded. On the first day of the crisis, most people were too stunned to do anything but follow the instructions that filled the media—stay put, seek cover, you are safer at home than out in the countryside—but the following night brought second thoughts.

The next morning, people in large cities all over America tried to get out. Surface streets quickly filled up, turning into bumper-to-bumper jams that in one case stretched for forty miles. Inevitably, those who found that route closed turned again to the freeways, where police, National Guard units and Homeland Security troops in black riot armor manned the barricades.

The flashpoint arrived toward sunset in Trenton, New Jersey, where a terrified mob, convinced that the missiles were already on the way, tried to rush the barricades on the John Fitch Parkway. Someone in the crowd had a handgun; shots rang out; an inexperienced Homeland Security officer panicked, and ordered his troops to open fire. By the time the shooting stopped, thirty-seven civilians were dead and more than a hundred wounded.

The government scrambled to keep word of the Trenton Massacre, as it came to be called, from getting out. News media had already been put under wartime censorship, and social media online were pressured into deleting references to the shootings as they appeared, but email and telephones were harder to stop. Worse, the lack of accurate information fed terrifying rumors. As Americans huddled in makeshift bomb shelters across the country, it was all too easy to believe that a government willing to plunge the world into nuclear war might be capable of anything. In the process, for a very large number of Americans, the United States stopped being “us” and turned into “them.”

That would have immense results in the near future, but there were also more immediate consequences. In Austin that night, after a flurry of calls from worried constituents, the governor of Texas pulled rank on the phone company, got a line through to a business friend of his in Trenton, and obtained a good account of what had happened. The governor could all too easily imagine what would happen if such an incident happened in proud, gun-loving Texas, and his next call was to Homeland Security.

The official cut him off halfway through a sentence with a brisk we-have-our-orders brushoff, and the conversation went downhill from there. Finally the governor slammed down the phone with a roar of polymorphous profanity that left his assistants awed. He flung himself up from the desk and paced around the room—a danger sign everyone in the state government knew and feared—and then returned to the phone, calling the old Army buddy of his who was the commander of the Texas National Guard, and the close political ally of his who was the head of the Texas Rangers. Both had been put under Homeland Security authority by executive order for the duration of the crisis, but a clash between Washington orders and Texas loyalties could have only one result.

Then the governor called Homeland Security back. “You listen to me, sumbitch,” he said, stabbing the air with a finger the size of a sausage. “You’re out of a job in this state. The Texas National Guard and the Texas Rangers will be handling public safety in this state, under my command.”
“You can’t do that,” the official spluttered.
“Try me.” Another jab with the finger. “Get your thugs out of my state in twenty-four hours. You hear me? Twenty-four hours.” He slammed down the phone, hard. Minutes later, on a new phone, he was calling drinking buddies of his who happened also to be the governors of half a dozen Southern states.

Across the nation, as the third day of the nuclear crisis began and the news of the Trenton Massacre spread, the same pattern played out on many different scales, and the federal government began to lose control of its security forces. Police officers in some places refused to man the barricades or pulled them open and waved people through. National Guardsmen in some cities stayed in their barracks or simply joined the crowds, taking their guns with them. Texas was openly defying the national government—the Homeland Security director there, after frantic calls to Washington, fled to Denver—and four other states were on the brink of joining in.

It may have been this hard reality, added to the other pressures he faced, that convinced Jameson Weed to take the only way out of the crisis. That night, just before midnight, he met with the secretary general of the United Nations and agreed to a ceasefire.

See also:
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 1 Hubris 10/3/12
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 2 Nemisis 10/10/12 
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 4 Crossing the Line 10/25/12
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 5 Dissolution 10/31/12 



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How It Could Happen - Nemisis

SUBHEAD: B-52s pounded anything that looked vaguely like a military target, but it was hard for anyone to miss the fact that the US was losing the war.

By John Michael Greer on 10 October 2012 for Archdruid Report - (http://thearchdruidreport.blogspot.com/2012/10/how-it-could-happen-part-two-nemesis.html)

[Author's note: This is tpart 2 of a 5 parts fictional narrative tracing out a scenario of American imperial defeat and collapse. As already mentioned, this is scenario rather than prophecy—an outline of what could happen rather than a prediction of what will happen, and thus an exploration of some of the major vulnerabilities in America’s faltering empire. It may also be worth saying that no real aircraft carriers were harmed in the making of this narrative.]


Image above: US Nimitz Class nuclear carrier in high speed attack avoidance maneuver  From (http://forum.woodenboat.com/showthread.php?139386-Proposed-Chinese-Aircraft-Carrier).

The missiles and fighter-bombers launched from the fleet were the second wave of the American assault, not the first. Attack helicopters from Kenyan bases took off a few minutes later, but went in ahead to target Tanzania’s air defenses. Their timing was precise; by the time the first US jets crossed into Tanzanian airspace, the four military radar stations that anchored the northern end of Tanzania’s air defense system were smoking rubble. Real-time satellite images brought news of the successful strike to Admiral Deckmann and his staff aboard the USS George Washington, and to President Weed and his advisers in the situation room in the White House.

Those images were on the screens when the whole US military satellite system suddenly went dark.

In US bases around the world, baffled technicians tried to reconnect with the satellite network, only to find that there was no network with which to reconnect. NORAD reported that all the satellites were still in their orbits and showed every sign of still being operational, but none would respond to signals from ground stations or send data back down. Analysis quickly ruled out a technical failure, which left only one option; the president’s national security adviser glanced up from a hurriedly compiled briefing paper outlining that one option, to find the Secretary of Defense regarding her with a level gaze. She turned away sharply and snapped an order to one of her aides.

Analysts long before the war had noted China’s intense interest in antisatellite technology. After the war was over, however, it turned out that what took out the US satellite system was not advanced technology but old-fashioned espionage. Chinese agents more than a decade earlier had managed to infiltrate the National Reconnaissance Office, the branch of the US intelligence community that managed the nation’s spy satellites, and data obtained by those agents enabled Chinese computer scientists to hack into the electronic system that controlled US military satellites in orbit and shut the whole network down, robbing US units around the world of their communications and reconnaissance capabilities.

Within minutes, cyberwarfare teams were at work, but it took them most of a day to get a first trickle of data coming in, and more than a week to get all the satellites fully operational again—and that was time the US invasion force no longer had.

The Chinese technicians who had slipped into Tanzania in the months before the war had strict orders that no action was to be taken under any circumstances until the US began active hostilities. The terse radio message announcing the destruction of the northern radar stations removed that factor. The crews knew that they might only have minutes before American bombs began falling on them. Their mission was precisely defined by the logic of “use it or lose it,” and so everything that had arrived in the shipping containers went into the air in well under ten minutes.

Survivors’ accounts of what happened aboard the naval task force over the next hour are confused and in places contradictory, but apparently shipboard radars detected nearly a thousand targets suddenly airborne on the southwestern horizon. At least half of those were false echoes, electronic decoys produced by Chinese “spoofing” technology, and many of the remainder were physical decoys meant to draw fire away from the supersonic cruise missiles that constituted the real attack. Even by the most conservative estimates, though, there were at least 200 of the latter. The task force had some of the best antimissile defenses in the world, but naval strategists had determined decades beforehand that a sufficiently massive attack could be sure of getting through.

Those cold mathematics worked themselves out in a chaos of explosions, burning fuel, floating debris, and dead and dying sailors and soldiers. Of forty-one ships in the task force, three made it safely to harbor in Mombasa, and eight more—including one of the troopships—were able, despite damage, to fight their way to the Kenyan coast and get surviving crews and passengers ashore. The others were left shattered and burning, or went to the bottom.

 The fate of the three carriers was typical: the John F. Kennedy took three cruise missiles in close succession and sank with nearly all hands; the Ronald Reagan was hit by two, caught fire, and was abandoned by its crew; the George Washington was hit astern by one, staggered in toward the coast despite crippling damage to its steering systems, and ran onto a sandbar near the Kenyan shore. A Japanese news photographer on assignment snapped a picture of the abandoned ship—broken, ghostlike, the deck tilted nearly into the surf on one side—and that photograph, splashed over the media worldwide in the following days, became for many people the definitive image of the East African War.



Long before the George Washington reached its final resting place in the sands off Kilindini, US forces on the scene were doing their best to respond. The loss of satellite intelligence did not prevent the launching points for the cruise missile attack from being spotted from the air by drones, and US fighters hurtled south to hammer them; only the orders that scattered each of the Chinese crews the moment their last cruise missile went up kept them from suffering horrific casualties, and as it was, more than a thousand Tanzanian civilians were killed. More than half the planes on the three carriers had taken off before the carriers were put out of action, furthermore, and those that made it safely to Kenyan territory were refueled and put to use immediately, carrying out punishing strikes against Tanzanian military and political targets.

Back in Washington DC, President Weed ordered a media blackout on the disaster. His press secretary announced merely that the task force had been attacked by missiles, and that details would be coming later. That night, meeting with his advisers and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he reviewed what was known about the fate of the task force, frowned, and muttered an expletive. “They bloodied our nose, no question,” he said. “If we cave in, though, we’re screwed. We’ve got to reinforce the troops in Kenya and proceed with the operation. I want a plan on my desk first thing tomorrow.”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that year was Admiral Roland Waite, a patrician New Englander with Navy ties going back to an ancestor who sailed with John Paul Jones. “You’ll have it, sir,” he said. “If I may suggest, though—”

The president motioned for him to continue.

“A plan for extracting our forces, sir. Just in case.”

“We can’t.” The president all at once looked older than his sixty years. “If we cave in, we’re screwed. The whole country is screwed.”

The plan was on the president’s desk at 6 am: a sketchy but viable draft of an airlift operation, using most of the Pentagon’s available air transport capacity to get troops and supplies from Europe and the Persian Gulf to Kenya in a hurry. By the time it reached the Oval Office, though, the unfolding situation had already rendered it hopelessly obsolete.




Image above: Chinese J-20 fighter jet on tarmac being evaluated by Chinese technicians.  From (http://forum.woodenboat.com/showthread.php?139386-Proposed-Chinese-Aircraft-Carrier).

The planes took off from airbases in Central Asia as soon as word came that the enemy satellite network was disabled. A flurry of secret diplomacy in the months before the war had cleared flight paths through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and positioned tankers for in-flight refueling in the latter country; Iranian civilians waved and cheered as the planes roared by, guessing their destination. As ships burned and sank off the Kenyan coast, six Chinese fighter wings were on their way to Tanzania, with more to follow.

Their route was not quite direct, since Tanzania was under heavy air attack by the Americans and thus could provide no safe airfields. Instead, an airbase in the Chinese client state of South Sudan served as a final staging area. More shipping containers had ended up there, and some of the tight-lipped young men as well.

Fresh pilots climbed aboard the fighters, fuel tanks were topped up, aircrews loaded and armed weapons, and the first wave of the air counterattack hurtled southeast into Kenyan airspace. American radar crews on the ground misidentified them at first as friendly craft, delaying an effective response for a few minutes. The moment the newcomers began attack runs on one of the American airbases, though, that mistake was cleared up, and US fighters already in the air pounced on the Chinese fighters while those on the ground roared up to join the fight.

An hour into the air battle, the American commanders on the scene and in the Persian Gulf were clear on three things. The first was that the planes and their pilots were Chinese, even though every plane had had the red star of the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force carefully painted over with the green roundel and white torch of the Tanzanian Air Force. The second was that, at least at the moment, the Chinese had the advantage of numbers. That was less of a problem than it might have been, since the US had plenty of fighter wings available to join the conflict, and four more were already being shifted to Persian Gulf airfields within striking distance of the combat zone.

The third realization, though, was the troubling one: the Chinese pilots were at least as good as their American counterparts, and their planes were better. Both US fighter wings in Kenya flew the F-35 Lightning II, the much ballyhooed Joint Strike Fighter, which had been designed to fill every possible fighter role in the NATO air services. That overambitious goal meant that too many compromises had been packed into one airframe, and the result was a plane that was not well suited to any of its assigned missions.

 The Chinese J-20s had no such drawbacks; faster and more heavily armed than the F-35s, they had a single role as a long-range air superiority fighter and they carried it out with aplomb. By the end of the first day, though both sides had been bloodied, US losses were nearly half again those of the Chinese force.

News of the arrival of the Chinese fighters forced the plans for resupplying the four US divisions in Kenya by air into indefinite hold. “Until we have air superiority back,” the Secretary of Defense explained to Weed and the other members of the team, “there are hard limits to what we can do. Even if we send them with fighter cover, the big transports are sitting ducks for their air-to-air missiles.”

The president nodded. “How soon can we expect to retake control of the air?”

“Within a week, if everything goes well. I’ve got four fighter wings on the way in tomorrow, and four more following them in two days.”

“What about the airbases in South Sudan?” the president’s national security adviser asked. “Those should get hit, hard.”

“That would mean,” the Secretary said, picking his words carefully, “widening the war to include another Chinese ally. Maybe more than one, if the other African countries in their camp get involved.”

“They’re already in,” President Weed growled. “Diego Garcia’s in range; I want a B-52 strike on the South Sudan bases as soon as possible.”



Two days later, a mob sacked the US Embassy in South Sudan. The staff barely escaped by helicopter from the roof. The B-52 raids the night before had cratered one of the two Chinese airbases, but also flattened two nearby villages and killed several hundred people. Across Africa, Chinese allies took turns denouncing America’s actions in East Africa and threatening war against Kenya, while the few remaining American allies lay low.

The denunciations were for show. The real decision had been made more than three months earlier, as Tanzanian and Chinese diplomats made secret visits to half a dozen Chinese-allied nations in Africa, explaining what America was about to do and why it mattered. The prospect of a Chinese military response made a difference this time; so did China’s offer to cover the costs of the plan being proposed; so did the cold awareness, inescapable as one head of state after another stared at maps and briefing papers, that if the Americans overwhelmed Tanzania, any of China’s other African allies might be next. One after another, they signed onto the plan, and began an indirect process of troop movements.

As news media flashed word of the South Sudan riots around the world, accordingly, the ambassador from Tanzania presented himself at the Kenyan presidential palace to deliver a note. Despite the studied courtesies with which it was delivered, the note was blunt. Since Kenya had allowed a hostile power to use its territory and airspace to attack Tanzania, it stated, the Tanzanian government was declaring war on Kenya—and over the next few hours, six other African nations did the same.

Three hours before dawn the next morning, an artillery bombardment silenced the animal and bird sounds of the coastal forest on the Tanzania-Kenya border, some fifty miles south of Mombasa. Tanzanian troops surged over the border at first light, backed by the first contingents from the other members of the Chinese-supported coalition and by a wave of Chinese ground-attack aircraft. By day’s end, forward scouts riding the armed light trucks that African armies call “technicals” were halfway to Mombasa, Kenya’s second city and largest port.

That night, Kenyan and American military officials held a hastily called meeting in Nairobi, chaired by the Kenyan president. The original American plan of action was fit only for the shredders, everyone recognized that, and the issue at stake now was not the liberation of Tanzania but the survival of the US-friendly Kenyan government. The next morning, after hurried consultations with Washington via the secure diplomatic line from the US embassy, the four American divisions left their bases and headed toward Mombasa, running up against Coalition forces two days later.

Under normal circumstances, the US forces would likely have seized the advantage and the victory, but these were not normal circumstances. The air war continued, but the Chinese edge was widening; the US air bases in Kenya had been bombed repeatedly, and efforts to resupply them by air even at a minimal level were running into increasingly fierce Chinese fighter attacks. Furthemore, the four US divisions had only part of their normal equipment—the rest was at the bottom of the Indian Ocean—and the troops they were facing included seasoned veterans of some of Africa’s most bitter wars.

The major issue, however, was air superiority. The US military had made air superiority so central to its military doctrine, and had achieved it so consistently in past campaigns, that nobody had any clear idea how to fight and win a battle without it. Generals who were used to aerial reconnaissance and lieutenants who were used to being able to call in air strikes were both left floundering when these and many other mainstays of the American way of combat were no longer available.

As the Chinese pressed their control of the air further and ferried in more ground-attack aircraft, US forces had to face the unfamiliar threat of air strikes, and US generals had to cope with the fact that it was their movements that were being spotted from the air. Finally, there was the impact on morale: troops who had been taught nearly from their first days in boot camp that air superiority guaranteed victory were unprepared to fight against an enemy that had taken air superiority away from them.

Which of the many factors decided the Battle of Mombasa remains an issue for military historians. Still, the results were not in doubt. After a week of hard fighting, Coalition forces took Mombasa and began to advance up the main highway toward Nairobi, while the battered US divisions and their Kenyan allies retreated before them.

The Kenyan president fled to Kisumu, in the far west of the country, with his mistress and his cabinet. Jets still screamed south from US bases in the Persian Gulf to tangle with Chinese fighters based in half a dozen African countries, and land-based cruise missiles and B-52s from Diego Garcia pounded anything that looked vaguely like a military target, but it was hard for anyone to miss the fact that the US was losing the war.

See also:
Ea O Ka Aina: How it could happen - Part 1 Hubris 10/3/12
Ea O Ka Aina: How it could happen - Part 3 The Brink 10/17/12
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 4 Crossing the Line 10/25/12
Ea O Ka Aina: How it Could Happen - Part 5 Dissolution 10/31/12  


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DOD creates cyber sock puppets

SUBHEAD: Be advised. U.S. Military launches spy operation using fake online "sock puppets" users for Facebook and Twitter.  

By Amy Lee on 17 March 2011 for Huffington Post -
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/17/online-persona-management_n_837153.html)

 
Image above: Website logo of DOD contractor Ntrepid who is creating internet sock puppets. 
 
The U.S. Military has purchased software designed to create and control false online personas in an attempt to use social media and other websites to counter anti-U.S. messaging.

According to the contract between US Central Command (Centcom) and California company Ntrepid (http://www.ntrepidcorp.com), the software would let each user control 10 personas, each "replete with background, history, supporting details, and cyber presences that are technically, culturally and geographically consistent." The software would also be able to let personas "appear to originate in nearly any part of the world" and interact through "conventional online services and social media platforms," while using a static IP address for each persona to maintain a consistent online identity.

These false online personas, also known as "sock puppets," would be equipped to seem like real people while entering online discussion through blogs, tweets, chats, and more. With a false persona, a user could discredit opponents, or create the semblance of consensus.

The Guardian explains:
"The US military is developing software that will let it secretly manipulate social media using fake online personas designed to influence internet conversations and spread pro-American propaganda".


Centcom spokesman Commander Bill Speaks told The Guardian that the software "supports classified blogging activities on foreign-language websites to enable Centcom to counter violent extremist and enemy propaganda outside the US."

The technology would not be used in America. "We do not target U.S. audiences, and we do not conduct these activities on sites owned by U.S. companies," Speaks told the Washington Times.

At a senate hearing March 1, Centcom commander James N. Mattis said:
"Our enemies operate within cyberspace (and its associated relevant physical infrastructure) to plan, coordinate, recruit, train, equip, execute and garner support for operations against the U.S., its allies and interests. Clearly, in the information age, our military must adapt to this new domain of warfare."
The online persona project is thought to fall under the domain of Operation Earnest Voice, which oversees Centcom's Information Operations, and in the words of Mattis, "seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda."

Online persona management looks to rely heavily on many American social media outlets, like Twitter and Facebook. But the latter has aggressively promoted its philosophy of tying real names to real online identities, deleting profiles it suspects to be fake, or which use false names. In fact, Facebook's terms of use clearly state, "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook."

The users controlling the personas would be hidden in a variety of ways, including randomizing the IP addresses they accessed the software with, and "traffic mixing," or blending web traffic with that outside of Centcom to provide "excellent cover and powerful deniability."

The strategy may sound familiar. Last month, hacker group Anonymous unloaded a batch of 50,000 emails from security firm HBGary, where documents indicated that the firm was in the process of developing their own persona management software. The document outlined some of the proposed strategies for creating verisimilitude:
Using hashtags and gaming some location based check-in services we can make it appear as if a persona was actually at a conference and introduce himself/herself to key individuals as part of the exercise, as one example. There are a variety of social media tricks we can use to add a level of realness to all fictitious persona.

OpenLeaks vs WikiLeaks

SUBHEAD: Openleaks, WikiLeaks rival, to launch as break away From 'Slave Driver' Assange.
 
By Staff on 10 December 2010 from Huffington Post -
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/10/openleaks-wikileaks-rival_n_794939.html)

  
Image above: Julian Assange and Daniel Domscheit-Berg in September. Photo by David Applebaum.

 
[Editor's note: This sounds to me like a cooptation that will actually cut-out the "openess" out of the WikiLeaks phenomenon. The crucial line in this article is "the new site will differ in that it won't be responsible for hosting the information itself directly for the public eye". This is no small matter. OpenLeaks will only be a middleman in the flow of leaks between anonymous whislte-blowers and "respectable" mass-media outlets (i.e. New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, UK Guardian) who will filter the material before consumption by the public. Sounds like a CIA compromise; - one the powers that be might be able to accept, if it means cutting out real transparency and that pesky public.]

Several key members involved with online whistleblower WikiLeaks are said to be deserting beleaguered founder Julian Assange to form their own rival site, Openleaks, reportedly expected to launch Monday.

According to the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, the new site will be called "Openleaks," and like its predecessor, will allow whistleblowers to leak information to the public anonymously.
However, the new site will differ in that it won't be responsible for hosting the information itself directly for the public eye, but will instead act as an intermediary between whistleblowers and media organizations.

"Our long term goal is to build a strong, transparent platform to support whistleblowers--both in terms of technology and politics--while at the same time encouraging others to start similar projects," a colleague wishing to remain anonymous is quoted by Dagens Nyheter as saying.

In a documentary by Swedish broadcaster SVT, obtained in advance by the Associated Press, former WikiLeaks spokesman Daniel Domscheit-Berg said the new website will work as an outlet for anonymous sources. The AP quotes some excerpts of the documentary:
"Openleaks is a technology project that is aiming to be a service provider for third parties that want to be able to accept material from anonymous sources," Domscheit-Berg said.
Domscheit-Berg, who during his time with WikiLeaks often went under the pseudonym Daniel Schmitt, said he quit the project after falling out with Assange over what he described as the lack of transparency in the group's decision-making process. "If you preach transparency to everyone else you have to be transparent yourself. You have to fulfill the same standards you expect from others, and I think that's where we've not been heading in the same direction philosophically anymore," he said in the documentary.
Members involved in the new site's formation are also reportedly incensed by what they describe as Assange's "autocratic" behavior, and believe the rival site will be more "democratically governed." In addition, many believe Assange's ongoing rape controversy is damaging WikiLeaks' reputation worldwide, according to the Sydney Morning Herald.

OpenLeaks Explained

SUBHEAD: Ex-Wikileaks staffer explains his spin-off group OpenLeaks.

 By Andy Greenberg on 9 December 2010 in Forbes -  
(http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/12/09/how-openleaks-the-first-wikileaks-spinoff-will-work)
 
Former WikiLeaks staffer Daniel Domscheit-Berg has always considered Julian Assange’s whistle-blowing site a two-pipe operation: One pipe takes submissions in from anonymous leakers, another publishes them out to an uncensorable web site.

But since defecting from WikiLeaks in September and watching the global controversy build around the secret-spilling organization, he’s taking a different approach with his own leak-focused project: Keep the anonymous submissions channel. Ditch the controversial and resource-draining publishing piece altogether.

The German Domscheit-Berg, along with several other former Wikileaks staffers, plans to launch a website they’re calling OpenLeaks as early as next week, Domscheit-Berg told Forbes in an interview. Like WikiLeaks, the new site will allow leakers to anonymously submit information to a secure online dropbox. But unlike its parent site, it won’t publish that information itself. Instead, it will allow the source to designate any media or non-governmental organizations he or she chooses and have that information passed on for fact-checking, redaction and publication.

That difference, argues Domscheit-Berg, will allow OpenLeaks to accomplish much of the transparency achieved by WikiLeaks, without drawing the same political fury and legal pressure.

“To constrain the power of the site, we’re splitting submission from the publication part. We won’t publish any documents ourselves. The whole field is diversified,” says Domscheit-Berg. “No single organization carries all of the responsibility or all of the workload.”


Resource constraints, as Assange told me in an interview last month, have forced WikiLeaks to choose only its “highest impact” material for publication. But those constraints have also politicized WikiLeaks and forced it to make subjective decisions about its targets, Domscheit-Berg argues. “We want to be a neutral conduit,” he says. “That’s what’s most politically sustainable as well.”

OpenLeaks will integrate with the organizations it passes information to, functioning as a secure tip box on their sites. Those organizations can choose to store leaked information on their own servers or leave it in the hands of OpenLeaks, Domscheit-Berg says. “All this is cryptographically separated in a fashion that everyone has their own dedicated part of the system,” he says.

The project will initially partner with five newspapers worldwide, but soon expand to anyone who wants to participate. “Newspapers, NGOs, labor unions, anyone who wants to receive information from anonymous sources, we enable all these people to run something like this,” says Domscheit-Berg.

And if the recipient organization chooses not to publish a leak? After a time designated by the source, the leaked material can be sent to other media outlets. “If a newspaper doesn’t publish it, it will be shared,” says Domscheit-Berg. “They can’t just put it in a drawer.”

Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks in September after a dispute with Assange over the site’s technical quality, its focus on infrequent, high volume leaks, and over Assange’s singular control of the organization even as he was charged with sex crimes in Sweden, as Domscheit-Berg revealed in an interview at the time with Der Spiegel. WikiLeaks has said that he “was suspended and then left of his own accord.” Domscheit-Berg will no doubt tell his own story in detail in an upcoming book planned for January titled Inside WikiLeaks.

As for descriptions that have emerged in the media of his site as a “competitor” to WikiLeaks, Domscheit-Berg says that’s a misunderstanding of his mission. “The people working on it don’t think WikiLeaks is headed in the right direction,” he says. “But what we’re aiming at is fundamentally so different that we don’t see it as competition.”

When I asked Assange about his thoughts on Domscheit-Berg’s project last month, he also rejected the “competition” idea. “The supply of leaks is very large,” said Assange. “It’s helpful for us to have more people in this industry. It’s protective to us.”

More WikiLeaks copycats and spinoffs fighting for their right to exist would no doubt help diffuse the controversy around WikiLeaks, as it struggles against governments around the world that want to shut the site down through both legal and technical means.

But Domscheit-Berg wants to distance OpenLeaks from WikiLeaks, and says he has no intention of sharing the controversy that WikiLeaks has fueled since it published the first of a quarter million secret diplomatic cables last week. “I never knew about any diplomatic cables,” he adds. “You can’t imagine how happy I am to be out of this thing.”


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WikiLeaks defenders' Cyber War

SUBHEAD: Ordinary people are being given instructions on how to mount a cyber attack, and likely many are trying it.

By Larry Geller on 10 December 2010 for Disappeared News - (http://www.disappearednews.com/2010/12/wikileaks-defenders-have-pulled-off.html)

Image above: Full out cyber warfare has begun between peoples and their governments. From (http://www.myce.com/news/wikileaks-events-operation-payback-turn-into-all-out-cyberwar-37516/).

You’ve heard of the cyber attacks against Visa, MasterCard and others who have closed their WikiLeaks accounts, of course. I was surprised yesterday after I followed a link and ended up on a page of instructions on how to join in on the attack. The web page had enough detail that had I wanted to, I’d be in business in probably less than an hour. It’s been since taken down, but mirrors are popping up here and there, so the info should still be available. This is a first.

I can’t recall a similar situation. Ordinary people are being given instructions on how to mount a cyber attack, and likely many are trying it. If this is just a blip on the radar it will still be interesting. If it is more than that, then a new era of “payback” may be dawning in which perceived corporate or government wrongdoing is met by cyber force mounted by thousands of sympathetic individuals.

Here’s more on the group responsible, Anonymous.

WikiLeaks has much of the world incredibly stirred up. This is both good and bad. For example, the news that Obama’s drones have killed 30 innocent civilians in nine recent attacks has almost disappeared. WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks. It’s everywhere. It pushes other news out of consciousness.

Not that your average daily newspaper would report on the drone attacks anyway. But at the moment, the websurfing public’s attention is diverted by who is doing what to whom as governments attack WikiLeaks and its founder Julian Assange, and as ordinary people strike back.

Events are moving very quickly. In the midst of this overwhelm there is some disappeared news. Since I recently wrote about PayPal, I’ll pick up on that one.

It was widely reported that PayPal had received a government letter, as a result of which it closed WikiLeak’s account. Their corporate counsel has just denied this. The new revelation means, if true, that PayPal made a decision on its own, correctly or not, to shut down the WikiLeaks account, and so it is now firmly in the crosshairs of hackers who may well figure how to either shut it down or at least impede its operations.

According to a report by PandaLabs, website attackers have accomplished the following:

After pulling the plug on payments to WikiLeaks, Mastercard’s website was taken down and remains at least partially out of service. Senator Joe Lieberman’s website was taken down for 12 minutes (the first .gov site to be attacked). Sarah Palin’s website was taken offline by a small group of Anonymous attackers. The group sent spam faxes to Joe Lieberman’s office and to PostFinance. PostFinance was attacked the hardest, leaving customers without the ability to conduct online banking. They took down the website of the lawyer representing the two women who were allegedly raped/assaulted by WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. The group took down Assange’s Swedish prosecutor’s website.

At this writing, MasterCard and Visa websites are back up. I could not get to PostFinance.

The cyber attack on the credit card companies did not stop ordinary use of the cards. In the case of PayPal, an attack against their API (application programming interface) may interfere with their ability to process transactions. PostFinance probably suffered the most since it is reported that customers could not use their billpay services.

Remember that WikiLeaks is not charged of breaking the law in any country. The hackers are breaking the law, of course, but they are not connected with WikiLeaks.

WikiLeaks itself is now said to be mirrored at over 1,000 sites. It is still operational even though Assange is locked up in Britain. The US government has lost the battle to keep it off the air, at least for now.

Here’s another bit of disappeared news. I’ve heard on the radio and on podcasts that this is also the first time that it is becoming clear in discussions that governments around the world (not just the USA) are working against their people. Duhh…. we knew that already. What’s new is that in a very few places, true, it is being discussed openly. The fact that Congress and the White House are still pampering the rich and starving the poor fits in, as does their failure to extend unemployment benefits. And so on. Each day something comes up to polarize Americans. Today it is denial of health services to 911 first responders.

For the first time in my experience there’s at least some discussion in the US that governments are not working for their own citizens but against them. In Europe that kind of discussion is much more common. Britain’s prince Charles, heir to the throne, was even caught up in a protest yesterday.

In a major security breach, demonstrators set upon the heir to the throne's Rolls Royce as it drove through London's busy West End on its way to a theater. A group of up to 20 struck it with fists, sticks and bottles, breaking a window and splattering the gleaming black vehicle with paint.

That’s Europe. Here, even talk about our government as evildoers is unusual. We haven’t taken to the streets as they have over there. I don’t mean all the crap on Fox News, what I mean is real discussion about why people and their government are opposed. But nothing has gone as far as stirring up major protests European-style.

Maybe we’ll skip the streets and it will just be cyber war. Who knows.

See also: Ea O Ka Aina: Ron Paul supports WikiLeaks 12/10/10 Ea O Ka Aina: Got WikiLeaks? 12/4/10

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